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deHoll: Moore v. Williamsburg Regional Hospital
MOORE V. WILLIAMSBURG REGIONAL HOSPITAL

The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 19861 (HCQIA) provides
medical peer reviewers with immunity from damages for actions based on the
reviewers' competence or medical conduct. Congress provided this immunity as
"incentive and protection for physicians engaging in effective professional peer
review.",3 Corresponding to this immunity are HCQIA's physician reporting
provisions, which require hospitals to report incidents of physician misconduct
and actions hospitals take against physicians.4 For example, a hospital that
suspends a doctor's practice privileges for over thirty days on grounds related to
professional competence or conduct must report the suspension to the Board of
Medical Examiners, and the information is included in the National Practitioner
Data Bank (NPDB). 5 This reporting requirement gives hospitals more
information to prevent "incompetent physicians [from moving] from State to
State without disclosure or discovery of the physician's previous damaging or
incompetent performance. 6
Peer reviewer immunity under HCQIA is not unlimited; rather, it immunizes
only participants in "'professional review action[s]"' based on a doctor's
"competence or professional conduct., 7 HCQIA defines professional review
action as the following:
[A]n action or recommendation of a professional review body.., which
is based on the competence or professional conduct of an individual
physician (which conduct affects or could affect adversely the health or
welfare of a patient or patients), and which affects (or may affect)
adversely clinical privileges.., of the physician.8
An action does not concern competence or professional conduct if the action
primarily concerns the doctor's association with a professional society, fees or
advertising, participation in certain types of health plans, association with a
private group practice, or "any other matter that does not relate to . . .
competence or professional conduct."9 Additionally, the review action must meet

1. 42U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (2006).
2.
§§ 11111(a)(1), 11151(9). However, HCQIA does not provide immunity from damages
sought for civil rights violations. § 1111 1(a)(1).
3.
§ 11101(5).

4.

§ 11133(a)(1).

See § 11133(a)(1); HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., PUB. NO. HRSA-95-255, NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK GUIDEBOOK, at E-21
(2001).
6.
§ 11101(2).
7.
§ 11151(9).
5.

8.
9.

Id.
Id.
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certain procedural requirements. 10 The reviewers must first make "a reasonable
effort to obtain the facts of the matter," and they must take the action based on a
"reasonable belief that the action [is] in the furtherance of quality health care"
and that the fact investigation warrants it.11 Finally, the reviewers must also
afford the physician "adequate notice and hearing procedures. 1 2
In March 2009, in Moore v. Williamsburg Regional Hospital,13 a panel of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that HCQIA
immunizes hospitals from liability for review actions based on a physician's
conduct that has a "clear nexus" to his ability to render patient care. 14 In so
holding, the court upheld a hospital's decision to terminate the practice
privileges of a pediatric surgeon who multiple social services agencies had
formally accused of physically and sexually abusing his child. 15 The clear nexus
test announced in Moore gives a hospital wide latitude to act on a broad range of
physician conduct but excludes from the hospital's consideration purely private
acts that have
no possibility of recurring in the hospital or affecting patient
16
treatment.
Blake Moore was a general surgeon with practice privileges at Williamsburg
Regional Hospital (WRH) in Kingstree, South Carolina. 17 While Moore
practiced at WRH, the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) took
Moore's adopted children into emergency foster care because of allegations that
Moore's wife had physically abused them.18 While in foster care, Moore's
adopted daughter stated that Moore and his wife sexually abused her. 19 In 2004,
DSS confirmed these allegations and initiated family court proceedings to
terminate Moore and his wife's parental rights. 20 Dr. Breton C. Juberg, WRH's
chief of staff and chairman of its Medical Executive Committee (MEC), soon
learned about the DSS suit and told John C. Hales, WRH's chief executive
21
officer, about it.
Hales obtained a copy of the case's court records, which
contained details of the alleged sexual abuse.22
After reviewing the records, Hales and Juberg concluded
that immediately
23
suspending Moore would best serve patient safety. On September 13, 2004,

10. Hospital peer review bodies are presumed to have met these requirements, but a
physician challenging a hospital's decision may rebut that presumption by a preponderance of the
evidence. § 11112(a).

11. § IlIll12(a)(1)-(2), (a)(4).
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

§ 11112(a)(3).
560 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 201 (2009).
Id.at 172-73, 175 (citing § 11151(9)).
Id.at 168.
See id.at 173 (citing § 11151(9)).
Id.at 168-69.
Id.at 169.

19. Id.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Juberg notified Moore of his immediate summary suspension pending resolution
of the DSS case.24 Pursuant to WRH's bylaws, the MEC held a suspension
hearing that evening, at which Moore could be present but could not vote. 25 At
the meeting, the MEC discussed the contents of the DSS court records and
26
listened to arguments from Moore, but it continued the suspension.
Two days later, Hales notified Moore of his right under the WRH bylaws to
appeal the MEC's decision. 27 Before the appeal hearing, WRH informed the
NPDB that it had suspended Moore because of "'serious allegations of sexual
misconduct of a minor child.' ' 28 Also before the hearing, WRH provided Moore
with a list of witnesses expected to testify and a proposed list of hearing panel
members.2 9 WRH granted Moore's request to exclude from the panel a doctor
who had treated Moore's children. 30 Moore and his counsel had an additional
opportunity to object to the panel composition and witnesses, but they made no
objection. At the hearing, Moore and his wife testified that they did not abuse
their children, and they presented forensic evidence indicating that no abuse
occurred and a psychological evaluation finding that Moore lacked the character
traits of a pedophile; however, even though the panel kept the hearing open for
two months, the panel upheld the suspension. 32
Moore appealed to WRH's board of directors at its meeting on April 11,
2005.33 He presented additional evidence at the hearing
and durin the following
to uphold the suspension.
week, but the board voted unanimously
On July 7, 2005, DSS moved to dismiss the sexual abuse case because
Moore had already lost his parental rights in a related proceeding. 35 Moore
requested that WRH reinstate his privileges because no sexual abuse had been
formally proven against him in court. 36 WRH rejected Moore's request because
he refused to provide WRH with the credentialing information required by
WRH's bylaws.
Moore sued WRH, Hales, Juberg, and other WRH staff members in the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging that the
suspension of his privileges violated his procedural and substantive due process
rights, and he sought monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 170.
Id.
Id.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32.
33.
34.
35.
Moore's
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. DSS had sued to terminate Moore's parental rights in a separate case based on
physical abuse of the children. See id.
at 169.
Id.at 170.
Id.
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law. 38 After extensive discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to
the defendants, holding that they were immune under HCQIA.39 Moore
appealed.4 °
A panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed.41 In the opinion, the court first
analyzed whether Moore's suspension constituted professional review action
under HCQIA.42 Moore argued that professional review should be limited to
decisions requiring medical expertise, placing his alleged sexual misconduct
outside the scope of HCQIA.4 3 The court rejected this "stark dividing line" as too
difficult to draw and unduly involving courts in hospital governance. 4 Moore's
view was also too narrow, according to the court, because it would prevent peer
review committees from acting on "even the most advanced cases of alcohol
addiction, illegal substance abuse, incipient dementia, or... sexual
45 misconduct
toward children on the part of someone with a pediatric practice."
The court instead held that "[a] physician's competence can be implicated by
conduct outside a health care facility if there is a clear nexus between that
conduct and the ability to render patient care. ' 46 Congress' decision to use broad
language-"professional conduct" instead of "conduct in the course of medical
practice"-gave peer review bodies great latitude to act on physician conduct
"that has occurred outside the hospital, but could realistically occur or affect
treatment in the hospital., 47 "Clearly[,]" the court reasoned, "the 'competence' of
a physician may be affected by arguably non-medical difficulties which are
manifested outside the hospital: a hopelessly alcoholic physician or one adjudged
to be mentally incompetent could only by happenstance render competent patient
care." 48 Moreover, because the definition of professional conduct includes
conduct that "'could affect adversely"' patient health, the court concluded that
hospitals may take prophylactic action to prevent anticipated future problems,
noting that "nothing the statute requires peer review committees to wait until
medical disaster strikes."4 9

38. Id. at 171, 180. Moore asserted claims under South Carolina law for "intentional
infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with existing and prospective contractual
relationships, defamation, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, unfair trade practices, and civil
conspiracy." Id. at 171.
39. Id. at 171. On separate grounds not discussed in this Summary, the district court also held
that Moore's § 1983 claims failed because WRH was not a state actor and that Moore's state law
claims failed. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 168. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judges Duncan and Agee joined.

Id.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 171.
Id. at 171-72.
Id. at 172-73.
Id. at 172.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 173.
Id.at 172 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (2006)).
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Meanwhile, the defendants argued that HCQIA immunizes reviewers for
acting on "almost any.., conduct that might, in the peer review body's opinion,
one day affect patient care. 50 Like Moore's view, the court rejected the
51
defendants' position as "too rigid-they treat this as an all-or-nothing matter.,
The defendants' view posed the "risk that driving infractions, messy divorces or
custody battles, tax or financial difficulties only tenuously or speculatively
52
related to medical competence might fall within the purview of peer review.
Such an expansive "fishing expedition[]" position would allow undue invasion
into physicians' personal lives; the court reasoned that, given that HCQIA deals
explicitly with professional conduct, adopting defendants' view would be "to
arm .. .reviewers with a club that Congress did not provide. 53 The court
reiterated that its clear nexus test was more faithful to congressional intent.54
Applying the clear nexus test, the court held that WRH's actions concerned
Moore's professional conduct and thus fell within the purview of HCQIA
immunity.55 The various bodies that heard Moore's administrative appeals heard
ample evidence of Moore's harmful tendencies towards children to conclude that
56
"he might sexually abuse child patients in the course of his practice."
Additionally, this reasonable possibility that Moore could molest a child patient
meant that WRH had to decide between potential liability for child sex abuse or
potential liability for suspending Moore-precisely the kind of "close call[]" that
HCQIA presupposes.57 Because the purpose of statutory immunity "is to afford
some discretionary latitude to decisionmakers to make close calls unhaunted by
the specter of civil liability," removing WRH's
58 discretionary power in Moore's
case "would defeat the purpose of immunity.,
Finally, the court concluded that WRH had provided Moore with sufficient
notice and procedural opportunities to satisfy HCQIA. 59 At each level of appeal,
the reviewing body considered evidence, heard witnesses, and gave Moore an
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. 60 The hearing panel left the record open
for two months so Moore could introduce more evidence, and WRH's board held
two meetings to allow Moore to present evidence. 6 1 As for the composition of
the tribunals, Moore complained that his first appeal violated HCQIA because
the hearing panel contained members of the MEC who had previously voted to

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.at 173.
Id.
Id.
Id.

54. See id.
(citing § 11151(9)).
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at

175.
174.
174-75.
175.
176.
175.
175-76.
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suspend him. 62 However, because HCQIA does not prevent members of one
administrative body from considering an appeal of that body's decision, the court
disregarded Moore's objection as irrelevant to the narrow question of whether
WRH complied with HCQIA. 63 Additionally, because Moore knew the hearing
panel's composition in advance of the hearing but failed to object to having
MEC members sit on it, he waived the right to object to the composition after the
fact. 64 Thus, the court concluded that Moore failed to show the defendants
violated HCQIA's requirements, and therefore, the defendants were immune
65
from liability on Moore's state law claims.
In announcing the clear nexus test for whether a doctor's actions affect his
competence or professional conduct within the meaning of HCQIA, the Moore
court provided a flexible standard for reviewing hospital peer review actions to
determine whether immunity applies under HCQIA. Though the breadth and
flexibility of the test make it deferential to hospitals, the test is not a result of a
judicial preference. Rather, the court remained faithful to Congress's intent to
66
give hospitals broad discretion in managing their credentialed medical staff.
The close nexus test supports that intent by focusing on substance rather than
form. With several categorical exceptions, virtually any type of conduct in
which a physician engages can serve as the basis for hospital action, provided
that the conduct in question possesses the requisite relation to the doctor's
medical practice.
Given this breadth, the test may seem hostile to physicians who challenge
adverse hospital decisions. The court attempted to limit the test's reach by
emphasizing that HCQIA was not intended to cover hospital decisions based on
68
a doctor's private, personal behavior. The court reasoned that "[h]uman beings
are not smooth and rounded pebbles, but often contradictory in their habits and
traits. A surgeon whose personal life might not bear close
scrutiny may
69
nonetheless save lives with his talents in the operating room.,
Although the court was certainly correct that Congress did not mean for
HCQIA "to encourage fishing expeditions into private behavior,, 70 the court's
personal-professional distinction confuses the scope and mechanics of the clear

62. Id.
63. Id. Regarding membership on a hearing panel, HCQIA merely provides that no member
can be an economic competitor of the physician. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(b)(3)(A)(iii) (2006). WRH
satisfied this requirement. Moore, 560 F.3d at 170.
64. Id. At his hearing before WRH's board of directors, Moore had objected to the panel's
composition; however, the Fourth Circuit considered that objection to be untimely. See id.
65. Id. The court also rejected Moore's state law claims on the merits. Id. at 176-78. It also
rejected Moore's § 1983 claim because it found no violation of his due process rights and because
WRH was not a state actor. Id. at 178-80.
66. See id. at 174-75; see also id. at 173 (describing HCQIA's protections of peer review as
"generous").
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9)(A)-(D).
68. See Moore, 560 F.3d at 173.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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nexus test. On one hand, the clear nexus test ignores categorical distinctions in
behavior, but on the other hand, the court implies that some activities are so
personal that they are beyond the possibility of having a clear nexus to
professional conduct. There are two plausible explanations for this result. First,
the court may have intended the test to apply only within a certain "twilight
zone" of physician conduct that is neither obviously covered by HCQJA nor
patently excluded from it. Second, the court may have intended the test to serve
generally as the test for conduct's inclusion within HCQIA, and the court's
discussion of the personal-professional distinction was simply an appeal to
hospitals and courts to use their practical sensibilities to find that, as a matter of
fact, some conduct simply will never have a clear connection to a doctor's
professional life. While either standard seems reasonable in light of the
competing interests at play under HCQIA, hospitals, physicians, lawyers, and
courts would benefit from some clarification of the mechanics of the clear nexus
test-particularly if the court had in mind some types of conduct that it felt
warranted per se exclusion from HCQJA.
This is not to say that the clear nexus test, as announced in Moore, is
fundamentally flawed. Rather, it clearly is a fact-intensive inquiry, and like all
judicially created tests, its meaning will become increasingly clear with each
new court decision that applies it.
Andrew R. deHoll
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